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Comment
PRESERVING THE WRIT: THE MILITARY COMMISSION ACT’S
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ATTEMPT TO DEPRIVE LAWFUL
RESIDENT ALIENS OF THEIR HABEAS CORPUS RIGHTS
On September 11, 2001, members of the al Qaeda terrorist net-
work struck targets in the United States, killing nearly 3,000 people in
the deadliest attack of its kind on United States soil.1  Since then, the
United States Government has taken several legislative and executive
measures to prevent another terrorist attack.2  Specifically, President
George W. Bush and the executive branch have repeatedly employed
the Authorization for Use of Military Force (the AUMF), a joint reso-
lution passed by Congress immediately after the September 11th at-
tacks,3 as legal justification for detaining whomever they deem to be
an “enemy combatant.”4  Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri was one such
individual.5
On December 12, 2001, al-Marri, a Qatari6 national and lawfully
present alien pursuing graduate studies at Bradley University in Peo-
Copyright  2008 by Katy R. Jackman.
1. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION RE-
PORT 4–14, 311, 363 (2004), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf
[hereinafter 9/11 REPORT] (offering an exhaustive account of the circumstances surround-
ing the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and recommendations designed to prevent
similar attacks in the future).
2. See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); Authorization for
Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001) (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp. III 2003)); Military Order of November 13, 2001, § 1(e), 3
C.F.R. 918, 918 (2002), reprinted in 10 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. V 2005) (regarding the deten-
tion, treatment, and trial of certain noncitizens in the war against terrorism).
3. §§ 1–2, 115 Stat. at 224–25 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note).
4. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509–10, 513, 517 (2004) (plurality opinion)
(concluding that the detention of an American citizen captured in Afghanistan and classi-
fied as an “enemy combatant” was congressionally authorized by the AUMF); Padilla v.
Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 388–89 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that the President possessed the
authority, pursuant to the AUMF, to militarily detain an American citizen who took up
arms with the enemy in a foreign combat zone); see also Michelle Maslowski, Note, Classifi-
cation of Enemy Combatants and the Usurpation of Judicial Power by the Executive Branch, 40 IND.
L. REV. 177, 195 (2007) (stating that the Executive relies on the President’s authority
under the AUMF to classify individuals as enemy combatants).
5. Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 163, 174 (4th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc granted.
6. Qatar is a friendly nation to the United States and has assisted the United States
with its fight against terrorism. JEREMY M. SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR
736
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ria, Illinois, was apprehended by FBI agents.7  The agents arrested al-
Marri in Peoria and alleged that he was a material witness in the Gov-
ernment’s investigation into the September 11th (9/11) terrorist at-
tacks.8  Al-Marri was subsequently indicted on numerous domestic
crimes, to which he pled not guilty.9  However, on June 23, 2003,
before his formal trial commenced, President Bush designated al-
Marri an “enemy combatant,”10 and he was transferred to the Naval
Consolidated Brig in South Carolina, where he has remained in mili-
tary custody ever since.11
Al-Marri’s is one of several “enemy combatant” cases that has
arisen from the Bush administration’s post-9/11 detention policies.12
Perhaps the most striking feature of these policies is that the Govern-
ment has repeatedly attempted to strip away federal jurisdiction over
detainees’ habeas corpus petitions, regardless of the country of which
the detainee is a citizen.13  The Government’s latest attempt, and the
one currently at the forefront of the jurisdictional dispute in al-Marri’s
CONGRESS, QATAR: BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS 8–9 (2004), http://www.fas.org/
man/crs/RL31718.pdf.
7. Al-Marri v. Bush, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1004 (C.D. Ill. 2003), aff’d sub nom. Al-Marri
v. Rumsfeld, 360 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2004).  Al-Marri was arrested based on instructions
from the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.  Specifically, on January 28, 2002, al-Marri was formally arrested based on a
criminal complaint that charged him with credit card fraud, and on February 6, 2002, he
was indicted and charged, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, with possession of at least fifteen unauthorized or counterfeit access devices with
the intent to defraud. Id.  Almost one year later, al-Marri was charged in a second, six-
count indictment, which included allegations that he had made false statements to the FBI
and false statements related to a bank application. Id.  Al-Marri again pled not guilty and
the court eventually dismissed the indictments on May 12, 2003 for improper venue. Id.
Immediately following dismissal, al-Marri was arraigned in the United States District Court
for the Central District of Illinois, Peoria Division, due to a new criminal complaint. Id.  As
a result, al-Marri returned to Peoria from New York, where he was then indicted on counts
identical to those with which he had been charged in New York. Id.
10. Id.  Soon after the President’s declaration, the court granted the U.S. Attorney’s
motion to dismiss al-Marri’s indictment with prejudice, despite objections from al-Marri’s
counsel. Id.
11. Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 165 (4th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc granted.  On June
11, 2007, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that
the military could not detain al-Marri indefinitely and, in granting him habeas relief, stated
that he must either be returned to civilian prosecutors for trial on criminal charges, or
freed. Id. at 164.  However, shortly thereafter, the court scheduled a rehearing en banc for
the case, to occur on October 31, 2007.  United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, Richmond, Va. (10/30/2007–11/02/2007 Session), http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.
gov/calendar/internetcaloct302007ric.pdf (last visited May 5, 2008).
12. See infra Part I.D.
13. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600,
2635–36 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2739, 2741–42 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-4\MLR402.txt unknown Seq: 3 15-MAY-08 8:59
738 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 67:736
case,14 is section 7 of the recently enacted Military Commissions Act of
2006 (the MCA).15  If applied to these individuals,16 the Act would
take away the right of an alien lawfully residing in the United States,
detained as an enemy combatant, to petition for habeas corpus in a
federal court.17  However, absent a valid suspension of the writ,18 Con-
gress cannot constitutionally remove such jurisdiction, although it
may provide a detainee with an adequate remedial substitute without
effectuating a suspension of the writ.19  In the case of resident alien
detainees captured and detained within the United States, like al-
Marri, no adequate, alternative remedy has been provided.20
This Comment analyzes whether aliens lawfully residing in the
United States, like al-Marri, have a constitutional right to habeas
corpus and, moreover, whether the recently enacted MCA, if applied
to this class of individuals, violates that right.21  The Background in-
cludes a brief overview of the writ itself and its interpretation by the
Supreme Court of the United States in landmark cases.22  However,
the Background focuses primarily on the post-9/11 decisions of the
Court, particularly those involving enemy combatants and their
habeas corpus rights, and the complex legislation that these cases
§ 2241(e) (Supp. V 2005), amended by § 7(a), 120 Stat. at 2635–36 (to be codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2241(e))).
14. Al-Marri, 487 F.3d at 166.
15. § 7, 120 Stat. at 2635–36 (§ 7(a) to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e); § 7(b) to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2441 note).
16. This Comment addresses whether section 7 of the MCA is unconstitutional if it is
applied to al-Marri and if it restricts his constitutional right to petition for habeas corpus.
Some, however, argue that the MCA does not restrict the constitutional right to habeas
corpus or that principles of statutory interpretation dictate that the MCA does not apply to
individuals like al-Marri and, therefore, that a court need not address the difficult constitu-
tional questions involved because of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. Al-Marri, 487
F.3d at 168, 171–72.  Following this logic, the MCA would have no effect on al-Marri’s
constitutional right to habeas corpus.  Thus, even under these analyses, jurisdiction over
his habeas petition properly resides with the federal judiciary.
17. § 7(a), 120 Stat. at 2635–36 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)).
18. The United States Constitution expressly prohibits suspension except in cases of
actual “Rebellion or Invasion,” where “the public Safety may require it.”  U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 2.
19. See infra Part I.A.
20. See Appellants’ Response to Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction at
33–34, 38, Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc granted (No. 06-
7427) (“[A]l-Marri would, at best, be subjected to a military status hearing designated for
battlefield combatants without review by an Article III court of his legal claim that, as a
civilian arrested by the FBI at home in the United States, he is not subject to military
jurisdiction at all.”).
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part I.A–C.
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have produced.23  The Analysis argues that the factual distinctions24 of
the al-Marri case warrant a constitutional analysis,25 and illustrates why
the MCA as applied to such facts is unconstitutional.26  The discussion
ends by calling on federal courts to retain jurisdiction over the habeas
corpus petitions of resident aliens who are detained as enemy combat-
ants within the United States.27
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Writ of Habeas Corpus
A writ of habeas corpus issued by a federal court is the traditional
remedy for unlawful imprisonment.28  For centuries, it has been “es-
teemed the best and only sufficient defence [sic] of personal free-
dom.”29  Its purpose is to provide an individual subjected to detention
with a meaningful opportunity to challenge the factual basis for his
detention in court.30  Thus, the writ has historically “served as a means
of reviewing the legality of detention, and it is in that context that its
protections have been strongest.”31
As a fundamental principal of personal freedom, the Framers of
the United States Constitution incorporated the writ’s protections
into the Constitution’s Suspension Clause, which states that “[t]he
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
23. See infra Part I.D.
24. This Comment uses the phrase “factual distinctions” to mean circumstances spe-
cific to al-Marri’s case that distinguish it from Supreme Court precedent, namely, al-Marri’s
status as an alien lawfully residing in the United States, his lack of affiliation with an en-
emy’s military, and his detention within the borders of the United States.
25. See infra Part II.A.
26. See infra Part II.B.1–2.
27. See infra Part II.B.3.
28. Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8, 10–11, 13 (1908) (granting a petition for
habeas corpus by a Chinese person who alleged that a steamship company unlawfully de-
tained him after immigration authorities denied him entrance to the United States, despite
his status as a United States resident and citizen).
29. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868).
30. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536–37 (2004) (plurality opinion); see also Steven
R. Swanson, Enemy Combatants and the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 939, 945–46
(2003) (noting that the writ of habeas corpus “‘is the appropriate remedy to ascertain[ ]
whether any person is rightfully in confinement or not, and the cause of his confinement;
and if no sufficient ground of detention appears, the party is entitled to his immediate
discharge’” (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1333 (1833), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/
a1_9_2s16.html)).
31. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).
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it.”32  The Framers intentionally limited the legislature’s power to sus-
pend the writ so as to guard against temporary suspension, as well as
permanent abrogation, of its core protections.33  Until now, this limi-
tation has been effective, as Congress has only suspended the writ in
“the rarest of circumstances.”34  In the absence of such circumstances,
namely rebellion or invasion, it is unconstitutional for Congress to
eliminate the writ;35 however, providing a substitute remedy that is
both adequate and effective to determine the legality of an individ-
ual’s detention does not result in suspension of the writ.36
B. The Civil War
1. Ex Parte Milligan
Discussions about whether the United States Government can le-
gally detain, try, or sentence an individual by military tribunal usually
begin with Ex parte Milligan.37  Milligan, a United States citizen, was
arrested during the Civil War and charged with aiding the Confeder-
acy.38  Milligan was immediately taken into military custody, tried by a
military commission, and sentenced to execution.39  Milligan subse-
quently filed a petition for habeas corpus, contending that the mili-
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  A federal statute confers jurisdiction on federal courts
to grant writs of habeas corpus.  28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2000).  Specifically, the statute pro-
vides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice
thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.” Id.
The Supreme Court has stated that this statute “implements the constitutional command
that the writ of habeas corpus be made available.”  Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238
(1963).
33. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Constitutional Law and Federal Jurisdiction Ad-
vocating Denial of Motion to Dismiss (Reversal) at 4–5, Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160
(4th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc granted (No. 06-7427).
34. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
36. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977) (holding that the writ is not suspended
when a collateral remedy that is “neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a
person’s detention” is provided); see also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305 (explaining that “a serious
Suspension Clause issue” would arise if legislation withdrew access to the writ of habeas
corpus and offered “no adequate substitute”); Janet Cooper Alexander, Jurisdiction-Stripping
in a Time of Terror, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1193, 1199–1200 (2007) (noting that the Suspension
Clause would not “be violated by withdrawal of habeas jurisdiction so long as Congress
provided an adequate statutory alternative for judicial review of detentions”).
37. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
38. Id. at 6.  Specifically, Milligan was charged with the following: (1) conspiring
against the United States government; (2) offering “‘aid and comfort’” to the rebels; (3)
inciting insurrection; (4) engaging in disloyal practices; and (5) violating the laws of war by
aiding the rebels through a secret organization. Id. at 58–59.
39. Id. at 6–7, 107.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-4\MLR402.txt unknown Seq: 6 15-MAY-08 8:59
2008] LAWFUL RESIDENT ALIENS AND HABEAS CORPUS RIGHTS 741
tary commission had no jurisdiction over him because he was a United
States citizen who was not a resident of any rebel state.40
The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the military commission
had no legal jurisdiction to try and sentence Milligan.41  The Court
reasoned with the facts to reach this conclusion, emphasizing that Mil-
ligan was neither a resident of a rebel state, nor a prisoner of war, and
he had also never served in the military or navy.42  Rather, he was a
long-time resident of a nonrebellious state, Indiana, and had been ar-
rested at his home by the United States military.43  The Court did not
deny that the crimes imputed to Milligan were of a grave nature, but
found that as a citizen of Indiana, he should have been tried by the
Indiana courts, if such action was warranted.44  In essence, the Milli-
gan Court concluded that when the civil courts are open and function-
ing, Congress cannot grant the power to subject civilians unaffiliated
with military service to military trial.45
C. World War II
1. Ex Parte Quirin
During World War II and its aftermath, the Supreme Court de-
cided a pair of cases concerning the rights of enemy aliens.  The first
case, Ex parte Quirin,46 involved the trial by military commission of sev-
eral agents of Nazi Germany who had secretly entered the United
States with plans to commit acts of sabotage.47  Although each of these
petitioners had previously lived in the United States, all were born in
Germany.48  The civil courts were open when the petitioners were ap-
prehended, but President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed a military
commission to try the alleged saboteurs.49  The petitioners argued
40. Id. at 108.
41. Id. at 107.
42. Id. at 107, 118, 121–22, 131.
43. Id. at 118, 131.
44. Id. at 130–31.  The Court stated:
If it was dangerous, in the distracted condition of affairs, to leave Milligan unre-
strained of his liberty . . . the law said arrest him, confine him closely, render him
powerless to do further mischief; and then present his case to the grand jury of
the district, with proofs of his guilt, and, if indicted, try him according to the
course of the common law.
Id. at 122.
45. Id. at 121–22.
46. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
47. Id. at 21–22.
48. Id. at 20.
49. Id. at 22–24. President Roosevelt’s proclamation of July 2, 1942 specifically stated
that all citizens, subjects, or residents of nations at war with the United States who entered
the United States during war and were charged with preparing or attempting to commit
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-4\MLR402.txt unknown Seq: 7 15-MAY-08 8:59
742 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 67:736
that the President lacked the statutory and constitutional authority to
try them in such a manner, but the Court disagreed.50  The Court
upheld the authority of the military commission and denied the peti-
tioners’ applications for leave to file petitions for habeas corpus be-
cause their acts constituted offenses against the laws of war, for which
the Constitution authorizes trial by military commission.51
The Government had claimed that the petitioners could not ac-
cess the courts given their status as enemy aliens and because the Pres-
ident’s proclamation prevented them from receiving a hearing.52
Although the Court decided that trial by the military commission was
permissible, it specifically retained the right to consider and deter-
mine whether the President’s proclamation applied to specific cases.53
The Court also concluded that neither the President’s proclamation,
nor the fact that the case involved enemy aliens, barred the judiciary
from considering the petitioners’ claims that their trial by military
commission was prohibited by the laws and Constitution of the United
States.54 Ex parte Quirin, therefore, announced the Supreme Court’s
penchant for retaining jurisdiction over the habeas petitions of de-
tained combatants.
2. Johnson v. Eisentrager
Eight years after Quirin, the Court in Johnson v. Eisentrager55 again
relied heavily on the particular facts of the case to issue a decision
regarding enemy aliens and their habeas corpus rights.56  This time,
the petitioners seeking habeas corpus were German nationals arrested
by the United States military in China and imprisoned in Germany
after World War II for violating the laws of war.57  After conviction by
a military commission, the prisoners petitioned for writs of habeas
corpus in federal court on the grounds that their trial, conviction, and
imprisonment violated the Fifth Amendment and other constitutional
provisions.58  The Court upheld the district court’s order dismissing
the petition, holding that there was no basis for federal jurisdiction
acts of sabotage would “‘be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military
tribunals.’” Id. at 22–23.
50. Id. at 24–25.
51. Id. at 45–46, 48.
52. Id. at 24–25.
53. Id. at 25.
54. Id.
55. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
56. Id. at 765, 768, 777–78, 790–91.
57. Id. at 765–66.  Petitioners had been convicted of participating in, allowing, or or-
dering military activity against the United States after Germany’s surrender. Id. at 766.
58. Id. at 765–67.
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and that the military had proper authority to try and convict these
prisoners.59  More specifically, the Court found no basis for issuing
the writ to enemy aliens who had not been within the territorial juris-
diction of the United States at any relevant time during their captivity
or legal proceedings.60
However, the Court spoke at length about the legal status of
aliens, and implied that if the petitioners had been resident aliens,
instead of enemy aliens abroad, the Court might have invoked juris-
diction and ruled on the merits of the case.61  Specifically, the Court
stated that since 1886, constitutional guarantees like the right to due
process “have extended to the person and property of resident
aliens.”62  Those constitutional protections, the Court further rea-
soned, are typically only impaired when the United States is at war
with the alien’s “nation of . . . allegiance.”63  The Court recognized
that the “disabilities this country lays upon the alien who becomes also
an enemy are imposed temporarily as an incident of war and not as an
incident of alienage.”64  Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that the
vulnerability of the alien’s wartime status depended upon whether he
was an alien of friendly or enemy allegiance.65
D. The Aftermath of 9/11
1. Authorization for Use of Military Force
Immediately after 9/11, Congress passed the AUMF, which au-
thorized the President “to use all necessary and appropriate force”
against “nations, organizations, or persons” associated with the Sep-
tember 11th attacks to prevent future acts of terrorism against the
United States.66  Since that time, the Executive has consistently
claimed that the detention of enemy combatants is inherent to war-
fare and authorized by the AUMF’s umbrella phrase “all necessary and
appropriate force.”67  This form of capture and detention has resulted
59. Id. at 790–91.
60. Id. at 768.
61. Id. at 770–78.
62. Id. at 771 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 772.
65. Id. at 771.
66. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224,
224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp. III 2003)).
67. Brief for the Respondent-Appellee at 22–23, Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th
Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc granted (No. 06-7427); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
516–18 (2004) (plurality opinion) (sustaining the Government’s alternative argument that
the AUMF authorizes the Executive’s detention of designated enemy combatants, based on
the above language); Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 390–91 (4th Cir. 2005) (highlighting
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-4\MLR402.txt unknown Seq: 9 15-MAY-08 8:59
744 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 67:736
in considerable litigation, some of which is unlikely to be resolved
soon.68
2. November 13 Order
On November 13, 2001, President Bush, using his power as Presi-
dent and Commander in Chief,69 and relying heavily on purported
AUMF authorization, issued a military order (the Order) that author-
ized the United States to detain and try by military commission all
persons “subject to this order.”70  Individuals “subject to this order”
include, if it is in the interest of the United States, all noncitizens
whom the President deems in writing to be either: (1) current or for-
mer members of the al Qaeda terrorist organization; (2) involved with
acts of international terrorism, including involvement in the prepara-
tion of such acts; or (3) guilty of “knowingly harbor[ing]” an individ-
ual described above in (1) or (2).71  The Order specifically prohibits
individuals from seeking judicial review of the President’s determina-
tion in another forum, be it a United States court or an international
tribunal.72  The Order is reminiscent of President Franklin D.
the Government’s chief reliance on the AUMF as support for the President’s power to
detain individuals suspected of aiding terrorists); Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673,
680 (D.S.C. 2005) (stating the critical AUMF language and then endorsing the Govern-
ment’s argument that Congress intended the AUMF to apply to hostile al Qaeda operatives
in the United States).
68. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 445–47 (D.D.C. 2005)
(discussing eleven habeas cases that enemy combatant detainees filed and noting that
United States authorities had relied on the AUMF to capture individuals not only in Af-
ghanistan, but also from countries such as the Gambia, Zambia, Bosnia, and Thailand,
even though “many of these individuals may never have been close to an actual battlefield
and may never have raised conventional arms against the United States”), vacated sub nom.
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom. Al Odah v. United
States, 127 S. Ct. 3067 (2007); Brief for Petitioners El-Banna et al. at 1–2, Khaled A.F. Al
Odah v. United States, No. 06-1196 (U.S. Aug. 24, 2007) (explaining that the petitioners
are all prisoners detained at Guantanamo Bay, captured in the aftermath of 9/11, claiming
to have never engaged in terrorism, and seeking “a fair and impartial hearing before a
neutral decision maker to determine whether there is a valid basis for detaining them”).
69. The United States Constitution states that “[t]he President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
70. Military Order of November 13, 2001, §§ 3(a), 4(a), 3 C.F.R. 918, 919–20 (2002),
reprinted in 10 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. V 2005) (regarding the detention, treatment, and trial
of certain noncitizens in the war against terrorism).  Historically, military commissions, like
those established in the November 13 Order, are utilized to efficiently execute the laws of
war. See Christopher M. Evans, Note, Terrorism on Trial: The President’s Constitutional Author-
ity to Order the Prosecution of Suspected Terrorists by Military Commission, 51 DUKE L.J. 1831, 1836
(2002) (stating that President Bush’s November 13 Order was “extraordinary,” but not
unprecedented (citing WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 330 (2d ed.
1920))).
71. Military Order of November 13, 2001, § 2(a), 3 C.F.R. at 919.
72. Id. § 7(b)(2), 3 C.F.R. at 921.
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Roosevelt’s proclamation and military order of July 2, 1942,73 but un-
like Roosevelt’s order, President Bush’s Order only applies to foreign
citizens.74
3. Rasul v. Bush
In 2004, the Court ruled on the first of several cases involving
persons detained as a result of the military campaign waged against al
Qaeda after 9/11.  In Rasul v. Bush,75 the Court determined whether
the federal statutory habeas corpus provision76 bestows a right to judi-
cial review of the legality of Executive detention upon aliens in the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba.77  In reversing the decision of the
court of appeals,78 the Court held that both American citizens and
aliens detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base are entitled to in-
voke habeas corpus in federal courts.79
4. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
The same day that the Court decided Rasul, it handed down its
decision in another detainee case, undoubtedly the more well-known
of the two.  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,80 the Court tackled the question of
whether the Executive has the authority to detain an American citizen
classified as an enemy combatant.81  Hamdi is an American citizen
who was captured in Afghanistan in 2001, suspected of taking up arms
against the United States.82
Speaking for a plurality of the Court, Justice O’Connor con-
cluded that the AUMF authorized the detention of individuals in the
73. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. R
74. Curtis A. Bradley, Agora (Continued): Military Commissions Act of 2006: The Military
Commissions Act, Habeas Corpus, and the Geneva Conventions, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 322, 323–24
(2007).
75. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
76. See supra note 32.  When Rasul was decided, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, among other provi- R
sions, spelled out which courts and judges had the power to grant a writ of habeas corpus
and defined to whom such a writ could be issued. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)–(d) (2000).
Section (e) was not added until Congress passed the DTA in late 2005. See infra Part I.D.6.
77. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470, 475.  Guantanamo Bay is a territory over which the United
States does not have “‘ultimate sovereignty,’” but “exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdic-
tion.” Id. at 470–71, 475.
78. Id. at 485.  The district court had dismissed the petitioners’ habeas actions for lack
of jurisdiction and the court of appeals had affirmed. Id. at 472–73.
79. Id. at 481.  The Court reasoned that because the habeas statute did not differenti-
ate between aliens and Americans held in federal custody, Congress had not intended for
the statute’s “geographical coverage” to vary based on the citizenship of the detainee. Id.
80. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).
81. Id. at 516.
82. Id. at 510.
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“narrow category” at issue here.83  Nevertheless, the Court further
concluded that a United States citizen detained in these circum-
stances had a right, as a matter of due process, to “notice of the factual
basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Govern-
ment’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker,” provided
the detainee sought to dispute such a classification.84  In fact, the
Court went so far as to say that “it would turn our system of checks and
balances on its head” to withhold access to the judiciary from an
American citizen seeking to challenge his detention merely because
the Executive preferred not to make such access available.85
5. Combatant Status Review Tribunals
Initially, Rasul and Hamdi appeared to be huge victories for de-
tainees’ rights, but these victories were short-lived.  On July 7, 2004,
barely one week after the Court decided Rasul and Hamdi, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense issued an order creating Combatant Status Re-
view Tribunals (CSRTs).86  These substitute procedures were imple-
mented, among other reasons, to provide Guantanamo Bay detainees
with (1) notice of their ability to challenge their designation as enemy
combatants; and (2) Executive review of such designations.87  Hear-
ings before the CSRTs allegedly meet the relaxed due process require-
ments that the Court set forth in Hamdi.88  However, the order of the
83. Id. at 517.  Specifically, the Court evaluated only a category of United States citi-
zens, like Hamdi, who were purportedly members of, or supportive of, hostile forces in
Afghanistan and who had also participated in an armed conflict against the United States
while there. Id. at 516.
84. Id. at 533.  Although they disagreed with the plurality’s conclusion that the AUMF
authorized Hamdi’s detention, Justices Souter and Ginsburg agreed that, given the plural-
ity’s decision, Hamdi at least deserved the opportunity to provide evidence that he was not
an enemy combatant. Id. at 553 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment).
85. Id. at 536–37 (plurality opinion) (“Absent suspension of the writ by Congress, a
citizen detained as an enemy combatant is entitled to this process.”).  Earlier in her opin-
ion, Justice O’Connor had also explained that unless the writ of habeas corpus is sus-
pended, it “remains available to every individual detained within the United States” and,
because the writ had not been suspended, it was “undisputed that Hamdi was properly
before an Article III court to challenge his detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Id. at 525.
86. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the Navy
(July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.
pdf.
87. Id. at 1.
88. Senior Def. Official & Senior Justice Dep’t Official, Defense Department Back-
ground Briefing on the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004) (transcript availa-
ble on the website of the United States Department of Defense), http://www.defenselink.
mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2751 (stating also that the establishment of
CSRTs was in direct response to Rasul and Hamdi).
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Deputy Secretary of Defense is explicit in that it applies “only to for-
eign nationals held as enemy combatants . . . at the Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base.”89
6. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
On December 30, 2005, Congress enacted the Detainee Treat-
ment Act of 2005 (the DTA), which added a subsection to the federal
habeas statute, purporting to strip the judiciary of jurisdiction over all
habeas petitions filed by aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay, except
as otherwise provided in section 1005 of the DTA.90  Under the DTA,
rather than having a right to plenary habeas review in a federal court,
Guantanamo detainees can only seek review of the rulings of CSRTs
and military commissions in the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit.91  Moreover, such review is limited to
consideration of whether the determination of the CSRT or military
commission properly adhered to the relevant standards and proce-
dures and “whether the use of such standards and procedures . . . is
consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,” to the
extent that they apply.92  Like the Department of Defense order estab-
lishing CSRTs, the DTA does not apply to detainees within United
States borders.93
7. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,94 the Court concluded that the jurisdic-
tion-stripping provisions of the DTA were inapplicable to detainee
In Hamdi, Justice O’Connor alluded to the notion that enemy combatant proceedings
could “be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive” during
military conflict.  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533 (plurality opinion).  As examples of such tailor-
ing, Justice O’Connor suggested the following: the acceptance of hearsay evidence, and a
rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence. Id. at 533–34.
89. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the Navy,
supra note 86, at 1. R
90. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, § 1005(e)(1),
119 Stat. 2739, 2741–44 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (Supp. V 2005), amended by Mili-
tary Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2635–36 (to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e))).  Specifically, Section 1005(e)(1) provides that “no court,
justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction” over “an application for a writ of habeas corpus
filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba.” Id.
91. Id. § 1005(e)(2)(A)–(B), (3)(A)–(C), 119 Stat. at 2742–43 (codified at 10 U.S.C.
§ 801 note (Supp. V 2005)).
92. Id. § 1005(e)(2)(C), (3)(D), 119 Stat. at 2742–43 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801
note).
93. Id. § 1005, 119 Stat. at 2740 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note) (titling section 1005
of the DTA “Procedures for Status Review of Detainees Outside the United States”).
94. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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habeas cases pending at the time Congress enacted the legislation.95
Hamdan is a noncitizen who was captured in Afghanistan in Novem-
ber 2001 and transferred to Guantanamo Bay in June 2002.96  The
President determined that the November 13 Order applied to
Hamdan and, therefore, that he could be tried by military commis-
sion.97  In a groundbreaking decision, a majority of the Court rejected
the Government’s argument and ultimately held that “the military
commission convened to try Hamdan lack[ed] power to proceed be-
cause its structure and procedures violate[d] both the [Uniform Code
of Military Justice] and the Geneva Conventions.”98
Thus, Hamdan represents another example of the Court finding a
way to retain jurisdiction over enemy combatant cases.99  To reach this
conclusion, Justice Stevens reasoned that Congress’s omission of a
provision extending the jurisdiction-stripping portion of the DTA to
“pending cases” was an “integral part of the statutory scheme” that
logically demonstrated an intentional move by Congress.100  However,
Justice Stevens’s interpretation of the DTA’s language was “far from
self-evident,” and is illustrative of the Court’s willingness to employ
less than obvious reasoning to retain jurisdiction over these important
cases.101
8. Military Commissions Act of 2006
Not long after the Court issued its decision in Hamdan, Congress
passed the MCA in October 2006.102  Section 7 of the MCA addresses
habeas corpus matters and replaces the previous language of 28
95. Id. at 2763–64, 2769 n.15.
96. Id. at 2759.  In fact, the Government alleged Hamdan had previously served as
Osama bin Laden’s “bodyguard and personal driver.” Id. at 2761 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
97. Id. at 2760.
98. Id. at 2759; see also Michael Greenberger, You Ain’t Seen Nothin’ Yet: The Inevitable
Post-Hamdan Conflict Between the Supreme Court and the Political Branches, 66 MD. L. REV. 805,
805–10 (2007) (commenting generally on Hamdan’s significance and “the sweep of the
decision”).
99. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2769 & n.15 (retaining jurisdiction over cases pending
when Congress enacted the DTA and finding “nothing absurd about a scheme under
which pending habeas actions . . . are preserved, and more routine challenges to final
decisions rendered by those tribunals are carefully channeled to a particular court and
through a particular lens of review”).
100. Id. at 2769.
101. Jana Singer, Hamdan as an Assertion of Judicial Power, 66 MD. L. REV. 759, 761–62
(2007) (noting that the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan suggests its intention for the
federal judiciary to play an important role in the tripartite scheme of checks and balances).
102. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codi-
fied in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
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U.S.C. § 2241(e)—the subsection that the DTA initially added103—
with the following:
(e)(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to
hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus
filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United
States who has been determined by the United States to have
been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is await-
ing such determination.
(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section
1005(e) of the [DTA], no court, justice, or judge shall have
jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action against the
United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the deten-
tion, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement
of an alien who is or was detained by the United States and
has been determined by the United States to have been
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such
determination.104
Unlike the DTA, the MCA’s habeas restriction purports to apply to all
alien enemy combatants, not just Guantanamo detainees.105  Addi-
tionally, Congress explicitly made these habeas restrictions applicable
to all alien enemy combatant habeas cases, including those pending at
the time of enactment.106
II. ANALYSIS
America’s unprecedented campaign against international terror-
ism—the so-called “War on Terror”—must be kept in perspective
when discussing the rights of resident aliens.107  The unconventional
enemies that America currently confronts, such as al Qaeda and simi-
103. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X,
§ 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2739, 2741–42 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (Supp. V 2005),
amended by § 7(a), 120 Stat. at 2635–36 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e))).
104. § 7(a), 120 Stat. at 2635–36 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)).
105. Id.
106. Id. § 7(b), 120 Stat. at 2636 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2441 note).  Specifically,
section 7(b) of the MCA states that the habeas amendment shall apply to all cases, includ-
ing those pending on or after its enactment, which “relate to any aspect of the deten-
tion . . . of an alien detained by the United States since September 11, 2001.” Id.  The MCA
preserves, with some amendments, the DTA’s scheme of limited review by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id. §§ 7(a), 9–10, 120 Stat. at
2635–37 (§ 7(a) to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e); §§ 9–10 to be codified at 10 U.S.C.
§ 801 note).
107. For example, do the factual distinctions that the Court has used to reach different
outcomes in prior cases have the same meaning in the “War on Terror” as in past wars? See
supra notes 42–44, 47–48, 56–57, 60, 77, 81–83, 96 and accompanying text (providing ex- R
amples of the facts that the Court has considered in previous cases).
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lar organizations, undoubtedly pose unique challenges.108  In addi-
tion to promising no concrete end to hostilities, this campaign
features no clear enemy to defeat, no specific theater of war, no physi-
cal territory to conquer, and no obvious leadership structures to elimi-
nate.109  However, while the current conflict may make adherence to
traditional wartime doctrines inadequate,110 basic notions concerning
access to the writ of habeas corpus must endure.111  As such, the Court
should ultimately invalidate section 7 of the MCA because, as applied,
it effectively suspends the writ of habeas corpus for resident aliens
under circumstances not sanctioned by the Constitution.112
A. The Constitutional Entitlement to Habeas Corpus of Resident Alien
Detainees
1. Judicial Explanation and Protection of the Right
The Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution en-
shrines an individual’s essential right to access the writ of habeas
corpus, except in certain instances of “Rebellion or Invasion.”113  That
clause says nothing about a qualification of American citizenship to
obtain a writ of habeas corpus114 and, in fact, the Court has previously
adopted just the opposite interpretation.115  For instance, in INS v. St.
Cyr, the Court explained that the Suspension Clause at least safe-
guards the writ of 1789, and added that both nonenemy aliens and
American citizens could access the writ of habeas corpus to challenge
their detention in civil and criminal cases during this time period.116
The Court subsequently reiterated this idea in Hamdi when it declared
the writ available to “every individual” detained in the United States,
108. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 1, at 361–64. R
109. Stephen I. Vladeck, Ludecke’s Lengthening Shadow: The Disturbing Prospect of War
Without End, 2 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 53, 53 (2006) (posing the question, with regard
to “[t]he ‘war’ on terrorism”: “Just what will mark the conclusion of hostilities?”).
110. See Daniel L. Swanwick, Note, Foreign Policy and Humanitarianism in U.S. Asylum Ad-
judication: Revisiting the Debate in the Wake of the War on Terror, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 129, 136
(2006) (“While continuing to use traditional tactics against those territorial states harbor-
ing or otherwise supporting our terrorist enemies, the administration has taken innovative
steps designed to more directly deal with terrorist threats, steps that more closely resemble
law enforcement than warfare.”).
111. See infra Part II.A.
112. See infra Part II.B.
113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
114. See id. (providing generally, without regard to citizenship, for “[t]he Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus”).
115. See infra notes 116–117 and accompanying text; cf. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. R
763, 771 (1950) (noting that certain constitutional guarantees, like Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process, have been extended to resident aliens within the United States).
116. 533 U.S. 289, 300–02 (2001).
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provided the writ had not been suspended.117  Although Rasul ex-
amined only the federal habeas statute, as opposed to the constitu-
tional right to habeas, the Court’s statements in that case may
nevertheless also support the notion that noncitizens detained at
Guantanamo possess a constitutional right to habeas review.118  As
these cases demonstrate, the reality of war does not automatically alter
or suspend resident aliens’ constitutional right to habeas corpus: “The
Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people,
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protec-
tion all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.”119
Thus, it is clear that resident aliens detained within the United States
have a constitutional right to habeas corpus.
Particularly in a situation like al-Marri’s, where a resident alien
has at all relevant times been within the United States, precedent sup-
ports preserving the resident alien’s right to habeas corpus.  Under
Milligan, the Government does not have the authority to subject a ci-
vilian to military jurisdiction, even in extreme cases where the writ of
habeas corpus has been suspended.120  Like Milligan, al-Marri may
have committed serious crimes during a period of “war,”121 but as a
civilian resident of a state where the civil courts have remained open
and functioning since his arrest, al-Marri is entitled to seek habeas
relief in court and, then, if warranted, should be subjected to criminal
trial and punishment, not military detention.122
117. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (plurality opinion) (emphasis ad-
ded); Bradley, supra note 74, at 332 (“There appears to be little dispute that the constitu- R
tional right of habeas corpus review applies to individuals detained in the United States.”).
118. Bradley, supra note 74, at 332–33; see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481 (2004) R
(holding that aliens held at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base have statutory habeas corpus
rights parallel to those of American citizens, given that such an application of the statute
would be “consistent with the historical reach of the writ”).
119. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120–21 (1866).
120. Id. at 121–22, 125–26.  Specifically, the Court stated that in cases of suspension, the
Constitution does not say “that [individuals] shall be tried otherwise than by the course of
the common law; if it had intended this result, it was easy by the use of direct words to have
accomplished it.” Id. at 125–26.
121. Compare id. at 122 (reciting the Government’s charges that Milligan had “‘con-
spired against the government, afforded aid and comfort to rebels, and incited the people
to insurrection’” during the Civil War), with Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 165 (4th Cir.
2007) (restating the Government’s determinations, following 9/11, that al-Marri is an “en-
emy combatant,” has close ties to al Qaeda, and has participated in conduct that “‘consti-
tuted hostile and war-like acts,’” among other allegations), reh’g en banc granted.
122. See Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121–22 (explaining that if Milligan needed to be
restrained, “the law said arrest him, confine him closely, render him powerless to do fur-
ther mischief; and then present his case to the grand jury of the district, with proofs of his
guilt, and, if indicted, try him according to the course of the common law”).
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Quirin offers another reason as to why it would be improper to
deprive a resident alien like al-Marri of his constitutional right to the
writ of habeas corpus.123  There, it was the Court’s duty “in time of war
as well as in time of peace, to preserve unimpaired the constitutional
safeguards of civil liberty,” even in the context of petitions for writs of
habeas corpus by enemy aliens.124  Surely then, the Court has an equal
duty to preserve jurisdiction over a petition for the writ by a friendly
resident alien like al-Marri.125
Moreover, the reasoning that the Court employed in Johnson v.
Eisentrager to deny those prisoners the constitutional right to habeas
corpus does not apply when the prisoner is a lawful resident alien.126
There, the Court identified six factors to support its conclusion that
the prisoners were not constitutionally entitled to habeas.127  Specifi-
cally, each was (1) an enemy alien; (2) who had never been a United
States resident; (3) who was captured and held in military custody
outside United States territory; (4) who was tried and convicted by a
military commission abroad; (5) for violations of the laws of war com-
mitted outside United States borders; and (6) who was imprisoned
outside of the United States.128  There are crucial distinctions between
the prisoners in Johnson and an individual like al-Marri.  Specifically,
al-Marri (1) is not a citizen of a nation at war with the United States;
(2) has been a United States resident for a portion of his life; (3) was
captured in the United States; (4) has not been tried or convicted by a
military commission abroad; (5) for violations of the laws of war; and
(6) has not been detained outside United States borders.129  There-
fore, application of the Johnson factors bolsters the argument that al-
Marri is constitutionally entitled to habeas.
Although some have attempted to distinguish Milligan because it arose in the context
of a United States citizen, not an alien, the Fourth Circuit panel in Al-Marri rejected this
argument, at least in the context of due process, given that Al-Marri is a lawfully present
alien who is a citizen of a friendly nation. Al-Marri, 487 F.3d at 182 n.11.
123. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1942) (rejecting the petitioners’ claims and
upholding the authority of the military commission to try them, but nevertheless affirming
that the Court retained jurisdiction over such habeas corpus cases, despite the petitioners’
alien status).
124. Id. at 19–22.
125. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text (explaining that al-Marri is a citizen of R
Qatar, a nation at peace with the United States).
126. 339 U.S. 763, 777–78 (1950) (declining to extend to the prisoners the constitu-
tional right to sue in federal court for the writ of habeas corpus because they were never in
a territory over which the United States was sovereign, and their capture, trial, and punish-
ment took place beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any United States court).
127. Id. at 777.
128. Id.
129. Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 164–66 (4th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc granted.
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2. Recent Legislative Complications
Although, as explained above, the Supreme Court has previously
accepted and safeguarded the constitutional right to habeas of resi-
dent aliens, analysis of their wartime rights has been complicated by
the legislation that has ensued from the Court’s post-9/11 “enemy
combatant” rulings.130  Although debatable, the DTA seems to have
stripped Rasul of much of its legal force.131  Similarly, the Court’s de-
cision in Hamdan has been qualified by the enactment of the MCA,
and it is an open question as to how the courts will interpret that piece
of legislation as it pertains to detained enemy combatants.132
What makes al-Marri’s case, and others like it, so interesting is not
simply the minute factual distinctions that differentiate it from any
prior enemy combatant case that the Supreme Court has con-
fronted.133  Rather, it is the factual distinctions combined with these
recent complications, specifically the enactment of the MCA, that
merit special attention.
B. The MCA and Its Constitutional Implications
In part due to the broad reach of the MCA’s habeas restrictions,
which purport to deprive all enemy combatant detainees of their abil-
ity to petition for habeas corpus in federal court,134 Congress has
given the Executive very broad discretion concerning the detention of
alleged enemy combatants.  In doing so, Congress left little room for
judicial consideration of the factual distinctions that used to be of crit-
ical import when dealing with these matters.135  This abrogation of
130. See supra Part I.D.
131. Compare Alexander, supra note 36, at 1197 (noting that the DTA “eliminate[d] any R
means of enforcing Rasul,” in effect making it a “nullit[y]” if the Government chooses not
to adhere to it), with Joseph R. Pope, The Lasting Viability of Rasul in the Wake of the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 21, 23 (2006) (declaring that the DTA did not
abrogate Rasul’s broad holding and instead allowed it to remain as “viable precedent” for
detainees held outside of Guantanamo Bay).
132. Greenberger, supra note 98, at 811, 834 (stating that the MCA is “a harsh rebuke of R
the Hamdan Court” and stressing that neither Hamdan nor the MCA offers “the final
thoughts” on the enemy combatant cases).
133. Specifically, the Supreme Court has never confronted an enemy combatant peti-
tion for habeas corpus in which the alleged enemy combatant, at the time of capture, was a
resident alien, peacefully residing within the United States during an undefined “War on
Terror,” and who was at all relevant times held by the United States military on United
States soil.
134. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600,
2635–36 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)).
135. Compare § 7(a), 120 Stat. at 2635–36 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)) (stat-
ing, in a blanket fashion, that “[n]o court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear
or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by” an enemy combatant de-
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access to the writ, combined with the failure of Congress to provide an
adequate substitute for resident aliens like al-Marri, constitutionally
invalidates section 7 of the MCA if it is applied to these individuals.136
1. More than Temporary Suspension
If applied, section 7 of the MCA would not result in a mere tem-
porary suspension of the writ; rather, it would completely abrogate the
habeas corpus rights of certain individuals.  As previously mentioned,
the Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits
Congress from suspending the writ of habeas corpus except for “in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion [when] the public Safety may require
it.”137  Currently, the United States is not faced with any “Rebellion or
Invasion” that could justify temporary constitutional suspension of the
writ.138  Moreover, there is nothing temporary about the MCA’s
habeas jurisdiction prohibition.  The statutory language does not re-
strict the prohibition, or limit it to the length of a “particular emer-
gency,” but rather purports to be a permanent revision of the federal
habeas statute.139  As such, the prohibition serves as something more
than a temporary suspension, in violation of the United States
Constitution.140
tainee), with Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777–78 (1950) (considering specifically
the factual circumstances at issue when determining prisoners’ habeas rights, and noting
that the privilege of access to United States courts did not extend to prisoners who were
not within any United States territory at any relevant time, such as the time of offense,
capture, trial, or punishment).
136. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (making clear that the writ of habeas corpus cannot
constitutionally be suspended except in very limited circumstances); Swain v. Pressley, 430
U.S. 372, 381 (1977) (asserting that provision of an adequate, effective collateral remedy to
evaluate the legality of an individual’s detention would not serve as a suspension of the
writ).
137. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
138. Bradley, supra note 74, at 334 (“The United States is obviously not faced with a R
‘rebellion’ and, more than five years after the September 11 attacks, the United States is far
from clearly faced with an ‘invasion.’”).
139. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Constitutional Law and Federal Jurisdiction Ad-
vocating Denial of Motion to Dismiss (Reversal) at 5, Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th
Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc granted (No. 06-7427); see also § 7, 120 Stat. at 2635–36 (§ 7(a) to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e); § 7(b) to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2441 note) (making
clear that the amendment to the federal habeas statute was effective against all cases pend-
ing on or after the MCA’s enactment if they concerned “the detention, transfer, treatment,
trial, or conditions of detention of an alien detained by the United States since September
11, 2001”).
140. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 304 n.24 (2001) (noting that it would be improper
to imply that the Framers had drafted a clause that would “proscribe a temporary abroga-
tion of the writ, while permitting its permanent suspension”).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-4\MLR402.txt unknown Seq: 20 15-MAY-08 8:59
2008] LAWFUL RESIDENT ALIENS AND HABEAS CORPUS RIGHTS 755
2. No Adequate Remedial Substitute
In its hasty attempt to remedy the problems of the DTA,141
through enactment of the MCA, Congress has effectively abrogated
the writ of habeas corpus for resident aliens like al-Marri142 without
providing an adequate remedial substitute.143  The CSRTs established
by the Executive cannot possibly represent an adequate replacement
for the habeas corpus rights of resident alien enemy combatants, cap-
tured and detained within the United States, because such individuals
do not fall within the definition of those with access to CSRTs.144  Spe-
cifically, the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s order establishing CSRTs
states at the outset that it “applies only to foreign nationals held as
enemy combatants in the control of the Department of Defense at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba . . . .”145  Moreover, section 1005 of
the DTA is titled “Procedures for Status Review of Detainees Outside
the United States.”146  The Government, therefore, made clear in
these two documents that the alternative system of justice that the
CSRTs provide is not required for those enemy combatants detained
within the United States.147  Consequently, it is invalid to argue that
the MCA habeas jurisdiction-stripping provision is constitutional be-
cause resident alien enemy combatants detained within the United
States have access to a habeas substitute, in the form of a CSRT.
3. All Eyes on the Judiciary
According to the Supreme Court’s understanding of our system
of checks and balances, the federal judiciary must be “an indispensa-
ble player,” especially when “national security policy implicates issues
141. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2763–64 (2006) (holding that the DTA’s
provision stripping federal jurisdiction of the right to hear detainees’ petitions for habeas
corpus did not apply to cases pending when the DTA was enacted).
142. § 7, 120 Stat. at 2635–36 (§ 7(a) to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e); § 7(b) to be
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2441 note) (repealing federal jurisdiction over the habeas cases of
resident alien enemy combatants detained by the United States, including those pending
on the date of the MCA’s enactment).
143. Appellants’ Response to Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction at
33–34, Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc granted (No. 06-7427)
(“The MCA . . . would repeal habeas jurisdiction over al-Marri’s case without guaranteeing
any substitute, let alone the adequate and effective substitute that the Constitution
requires.”).
144. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the Navy,
supra note 86. R
145. Id. at 1.
146. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, § 1005, 119
Stat. 2739, 2740–44 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note (Supp. V 2005)) (emphasis added).
147. See supra Part I.D.5–6.
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of individual liberty.”148  The habeas provisions of the MCA, if applied
to resident alien enemy combatants detained within the United States,
fail to provide these individuals with a route to challenge their indefi-
nite detention.149  It is imperative that federal courts retain jurisdic-
tion over these habeas petitions, and that, in spite of the MCA, the
judicial branch play its appropriate constitutional role.  The fact that
this is a case of first impression is irrelevant; the Court has consistently
upheld the power of the federal courts to review habeas petitions in a
variety of cases involving Executive detention,150 even if doing so re-
quired the Court to interpret statutory language in a less than obvious
manner.151
III. CONCLUSION
In 2006, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act, which
purports to strip federal courts of jurisdiction over any then-pending
or future habeas petitions filed by all alien enemy combatants de-
tained by the United States.152  However, this provision, if applied to
the unique factual circumstances of a resident alien captured and de-
tained within American borders, cannot stand.153  It would eliminate
the resident alien’s constitutional right to habeas corpus154 in the ab-
sence of a valid Congressional suspension and without providing an
effective, adequate substitute.155  This is unconstitutional.156  As such,
the federal judiciary must reclaim jurisdiction over enemy combatant
148. Singer, supra note 101, at 761; see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2800 R
(2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) (declaring that trial by military commissions concentrates
power in the Executive in a manner that the “Constitution’s three-part system is designed
to avoid” and, as such, “raises separation-of-powers concerns of the highest order,” and
then proceeding to explain how the judiciary evaluates whether adequate authority exists
for Executive actions).
149. See supra Part II.B.2.
150. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510–11, 525 (2004) (plurality opinion) (find-
ing it to be “undisputed” that the habeas corpus petition of an alleged enemy combatant of
American citizenship was properly before an Article III court); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,
484 (2004) (holding that a federal district court had jurisdiction over habeas corpus peti-
tions filed by detainees held at Guantanamo Bay); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1942)
(rejecting the Government’s argument that the enemy alien petitioners should be denied
access to federal courts).
151. See Singer, supra note 101, at 761–62 (characterizing Hamdan’s “holding in favor of R
jurisdiction [as] far from self-evident”).
152. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635–36
(§ 7(a) to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e); § 7(b) to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2441
note).
153. See supra Part II.
154. See supra Part II.A.1.
155. See supra Part II.B.1–2.
156. See supra Part II.B.1–2.
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habeas petitions filed by resident aliens apprehended and imprisoned
inside the United States.157  If it does, perhaps America will return to
more traditional techniques of investigating, prosecuting, and punish-
ing resident aliens who have engaged in criminal conduct.  The re-
cent policies and procedures that have displaced these methods,158
and denied individuals their liberty in the process, must not be
prolonged.
KATY R. JACKMAN
157. See supra Part II.B.3.
158. See John T. Parry, Terrorism and the New Criminal Process, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
765, 766 (2007) (commenting generally on the “new criminal process” that has developed
amidst the current “‘war on terror’”).
